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The main advantages of a laboratory financial market with respect to field data 
are: (i) it allows us a perfect monitoring of the available information to each 
subject at any moment in time, and (ii) it gives us the possibility of recording 
subjects' trading activity in the market. In our experimental design the 
information distribution is endogenous, since the subjects can buy costly 
private information. Inspired by the debate on the role of rating agencies in 
the recent financial crisis, additional to the private information we introduce 
an imperfect public signal. The study of the interplay between public and 
private information constitutes our contribution to the experimental literature 
on laboratory financial markets. In particular, in this paper we study the 
perturbation created by the introduction of a public signal on the information 
acquisition process and on the price efficiency in transmitting information. We 
conclude that the public signal might drive the market price if private 
information is not of good quality, leaving the financial market in “the hands" 
of the institution which releases the public information. 
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Financial markets have traditionally been analyzed under the paradigm of the ecient
market hypothesis, which states that all relevant information is correctly incorporated
into asset prices. Within this framework asset markets are viewed as ecient economic
institutions in aggregating private and public information. Nevertheless, only indirect
implications of the ecient market hypothesis have been investigated so far (see Shleifer
[2000]), since in a real nancial market it is impossible to have a full control of the entire
information set.
In order to overcome this problem, various experimental studies have attempted to
analyze the role of information in laboratory nancial markets. In a laboratory nancial
market, in fact, it is possible to have full control of the information set available to each
single trader in each moment, and, additionally, of the entire record of her or his trading
activity in the market. We can categorize these experimental studies into two groups1, on
the one hand those studies where information is exogenously given to the traders at no
cost. On the other hand, those settings where the information present in the market is
endogenous, that is, there exists a market for information that runs parallel to the asset
market.
In their seminal paper, Plott and Sunder [1982] study under which conditions perfect
information is eciently incorporated into prices. They address the issue of dissemina-
tion of information from a group of fully informed agents (i.e. insiders) to a group of
uninformed agents. They conclude that with replication and experience even uniformed
traders are able to decipher the true state of the world by simply observing market price.2
Plott and Sunder [1988] design a market with three possible dividend states to address
the issue of aggregation of diverse pieces of less than perfect (but certain) information
owned by dierent traders. They observe that prices deviate from the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium in those markets where traders have heterogeneous preferences. On the
contrary, they report that markets converge to the rational expectation equilibrium when
traders have homogeneous preferences, since it is easier for them to infer information from
the other traders' actions. The review of dierent experimental studies on information
aggregation and dissemination in a setting where (im)perfect information is distributed at
no cost suggests that aggregation depends crucially on market features such as common
1See Plott [2002] and Sunder [1995] for a thoughtful survey on experimental asset markets.
2Watts [1993] replicates the Plott and Sunder's experiments where the presence of insiders is random, nding
that the price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium worsens.
2knowledge, information distribution, experience of subjects, etc.3
One important nding is that, even under the best circumstances, information aggre-
gation and/or dissemination (when occurs) is not instantaneous, since the traders need
some time to observe the market activity, form conjectures, test them and modify their
strategies. Therefore, there is an incentive for costly information creation due to the noisy
revelation of information in asset markets (see Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). Sunder
[1992] is the rst to study experimentally such problem in connection with the revelation
of information in an asset market through prices using two dierent settings. In a rst
setting, the price of information is endogenous whereas the number of perfectly informed
traders in xed (i.e. a given number of perfect signal where auctioned o). In a second
experimental setting, the price of information is xed, whereas the number of informed
traders is endogenous (and not known by traders). In the rst setting, the main nding is
that the price of information decreases as traders learn how to extract information from
the price observed in the market. In the case of a xed price for information, the number
of informed traders varies among markets, since subjects suer a sort of coordination
problem. When many traders buy information, the price converges quite fast to the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium and it is dicult for the informed traders to recover their
investment. When only few traders are informed, the markets slow convergence to the
equilibrium price allows the informed traders to gain higher prots. A series of experi-
mental studies using dierent settings inspired by Sunder [1992] conclude that when the
distribution of (perfectly) informed traders in not common knowledge in the market, it
is harder for the prices to reveal information.4 However, in all the previous experiments
informed subjects are insiders, since the information received is always perfect or certain.
Within this framework Hey and Morone [2004] develop a very simple experimental setting
where heterogeneous and imperfectly informed agents have to trade a risky asset whose
dividend depends on two equiprobable states of the world. In their setting, each trader
can buy, at any moment during the trading period, as many signals as (s)he wants. Their
results suggest that the aggregation process improves when the quality and quantity of
information in the market are higher. Alfarano et al. [2006] add a further element of com-
plexity to the existent literature on asymmetric information introducing an information
market where the traders can buy, at a xed price, an imperfect prediction of the future
value of the dividend of a long-lived asset with a certain anticipation. The information is
3See Sunder [1995] for an detailed survey on this issue.
4See Copeland and Friedman [1991, 1992] or Camerer and Weigelt [1991], among others and Sunder [1995]
for a review.
3noisy with decreasing precision when the time horizon increases, and heterogeneous, since
every trader gets an idiosyncratic signal. In this more realistic setting, they observe that
the quantity of acquired information is rather homogeneous across the periods and the
traders prefer short-term rather than long-term information. However, the experimental
assets markets is not ecient in transmitting information, as transaction prices are often
far away from the fundamental value of the asset.
In general, the experimental literature focuses on the problem of the market eciency
in aggregating private information into prices. An interesting issue, that has not been
experimentally investigated so far, is the role of rating agencies or, in general, a public
signal in nancial markets. There are only few theoretical contributions while several
papers have addressed empirically the market impact of the rating agencies. Among the
former contributions, Millon and Thakor [1985] demonstrate that information gathering
agencies may arise in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. According
to them, in a setting in which true rm values are certied by screening agents whose pay-
os depend on noisy ex-post monitors of information quality, the formation of information
gathering agencies is justied because it: (i) enables screening agents to diversify their
risky payos, and (ii) allows for information sharing. However, Millon and Thakor [1985]
assume perfect knowledge by the information gathering agency about the underlying risk
of the borrower.
Still on theoretical grounds, referring to a multiple equilibria set up, Boot et al. [2006]
show that the rating is a coordinating mechanism, providing a \focal point" for rms and
investors. However, Carlson and Hale [2006] reach opposite conclusions. They build a
game theoretic model of rating agencies in which heterogeneous investors act strategically
and predicts that introducing a rating agency to a market that otherwise would have the
unique equilibrium, can bring about multiple equilibria.
The aim of our paper is to study whether the presence of public information (e.g.
information provided by a rating agency) can endorse the aggregation process of private
information. The research question of our paper is to verify the role of public informa-
tion in an experimental nancial market. Does subjects buy less private information if
they have access to public information? Does the public information play a role in the
aggregation of available information into prices? If yes, is it detrimental or benecial for
market eciency?
42 The Experimental Design
We have a market populated by a given number of agents. At the beginning of each
trading period, each agent is endowed with m units of an unspecied asset and M units
of experimental currency. The asset pays a dividend d at the end of the trading period.
The value of the dividend depends on two equally likely states of the world: H and L.
If the state of the world is H the dividend d is equal to 10, whereas in L the dividend
d is equal to 0. At the beginning of each trading period the true state of the world is
determined by the experimenter, but not revealed to the agents.
However, at any moment within a given trading period the agents can buy private
signals paying a cost c per signal. Additionally, only in those treatments with public
information subjects have access to a public signal, that has no cost to them and it is
common to all agents trading in the market. Such signal is made public at the beginning
of each trading period. Both (private and public) signals are partially but not totally
informative as to the true state of the world. Public signals are at least as good as the
private ones. These signals take either the value 1 or 0, such that the probability of getting
a public signal 1 (0) is P if the state of the world is H (L) and the probability of getting
a public signal of 1 (0) is 1   P if the state of the world is L (H). This means that, if a
subject observes a public signal of 1 (0), subject can infer that the asset dividend at the
end of the trading period will be 10 (0) with probability P and 0 (10) with probability
1 P. Following the same reasoning regarding the private signal, the probability of getting
a private signal 1 (0) is p if the true state of the world is H (L) and the probability of
getting a private signal 1 (0) is 1   p if the state of the world is L (H). In this way, if a
subject purchases a signal that results to be 1 (0), he can infer that the asset dividend at
the end of the trading period is expected to be 10 (0) with probability p and 0 (10) with
probability 1   p. Both, the value of p and P is known by the subjects. Apart from the
dividend paid out at the end of each trading period, assets are worthless at the end of the
period.
In most respects this experimental design is similar to Hey and Morone [2004], though
it diers in the crucial point that in some treatments subjects receive public information.
This is an important element of our experimental design, since it allows us to study
whether the presence of public information may act as a sort of disciplining mechanism
in the market, promoting the aggregation of noisy information5. However, this dierence
does not change the nature of the solution to the model (see section 4) as agents are
5See for more details Ferri and Morone [2008]
5informed about the relevant parameters: the positive dividend d, the cost of buying a
signal c, and the probabilities P and p.







Common to all treatments:
M = 1000, m = 10, c = 4,
] of subjects=15,
] of markets per session=10
Table 1: The experimental design and parameters.
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher [2007]). When
the subjects arrived to the laboratory the instructions were distributed and a Power Point
presentation, was showed on all subjects' computer screens in order to explain the exper-
imental setting and questions where answered. This was followed by 4 practice periods in
which particular subjects were asked to perform particular tasks (make a bid, make an
ask, buy, sell, and buy one or more signals). The brieng period lasted some 40 minutes.
Each treatment consisted of 10 independent trading periods lasting 3 minutes each.
At the beginning of the trading period the dividend was randomly determined by the
experimenter and paid out at the end of the trading period. It was unknown to the agents
until the end of the trading period. During each trading period subjects were free both to
introduce their bids and asks for assets or directly accept any other trader's outstanding
bid or ask. Every bid, ask, or transaction concerned only one asset each time, but every
agent could handle so much as desired as long as he had enough cash or assets (no short
sale was allowed). Additionally, each subject could purchase as many private signals as
he wanted during a given trading period, as long as he had enough cash. At the end of
a trading period, dividends were paid out and the subject prot was computed as the
dierence between their initial money endowment (M = 1000) and the money held at the
end of the trading period, thus the net prot is computed as: (dividend received per asset
hold) + (price received per asset sold) - (price paid per asset bought) - (price paid per
private signal purchased in the period).
At the end of each session experimenters calculated the subjects' total earnings in
ECUs, as the sum of the prot obtained in each one of the 10 trading periods, and paid
6them in cash.6 The average payo was about 20 e and each session lasted around 2
hours.7
3 The `Do Nothing' Equilibrium
Let us try in this section to provide for an equilibrium which might help to analyze the
experimental data. We can say two things: First, we can think that the price in the market
should converge to the true value of the dividend if the market correctly aggregates the
costly information available to the agents. This is the conclusion that would be reached
by the literature starting with Grossman and Stiglitz [1976, 1980] on the aggregation of
costly information in market contexts. However, the nature of the theory of that strand of
the literature does not provide a description of the process by which the market converges,
but rather a theory of the equilibrium state of the price in such a market. If we want to
address the issue of the description of the price convergence we could rely on the literature
on informational cascades in a non-market context introduced by Banerjee [1992] and
Bikhchandani et al. [1992] which inspired our experimental setting.8 Even in this case,
the theory just partially provides an intuition of what could be a theoretical solution.
However, we can identify one possible equilibrium in which no agent does anything. This
equilibrium is not aected by the presence or not of any public signal.
3.1 Private information
In absence of public information all subjects at the beginning of the trading period will
have the same prior, since each subject will be able to evaluate the uninformed expected
value of the asset (i.e. d
2 = 5). If all except one agent is doing nothing, then it is clearly
optimal for the remaining agents to do nothing, and this remaining agent can neither buy
nor sell (because no one else is selling or buying) and so can only buy signals. But there
is no point in buying signals as no use can be made of the knowledge gained. So doing
nothing is one possible symmetric equilibrium.
We now argue that this is the only possible equilibrium in a world populated by risk-
neutral agents. To demonstrate this, we begin by noting that the expected per-period
payo for any subject who does nothing must be md
2 because each subject is endowed
6One experimental currency unit is equivalent to 2 cents of euro.
7Note that agents can make losses. To avoid some of the problems associated with subjects making real
losses in experiments, we endowed all agents with a participation fee of 5 e, which could be used to oset losses.
8See Hey and Morone [2004] for more details.
7with m units of the asset, each of which is worth either d or 0 with equal probability.
Suppose now that some subject buys n signals. Because these signals are costly this
subject must be expecting to make at least md
2 + n  c from trading the asset. Because
the game is a constant sum game, this must imply that the remaining subjects must be
averaging md
2   nc
(s 1) from trading the asset. As this is less than what they would get
doing nothing, it is clearly better for them to do nothing, from which it follows that our
rst subject can not be making at least md
2 + n  c from trading the asset. In this case,
the purchase of n signals can not be worthwhile and, therefore, such behavior is not an
equilibrium. This would suggest that we would see no trade in a model in which all the
agents are risk neutral.
3.2 Private and public information
Introducing public information will not aect the no trade equilibrium, if all agents have
the same beliefs about the future value of the dividend and if all agents are equally risk-
averse then we would again observe no trade. In fact if the signal of the rating agency
is 1 (0) each subject will be able to evaluate the expected value of the asset under the
public information, i.e. d  p (d  (1   p)). If all except one agent is doing nothing, then it
is clearly optimal for the remaining agents to do nothing and once again, doing nothing
is one possible symmetric equilibrium. Following the same root of reasoning as before we
can show that this is the only possible equilibrium in a world populated by risk-neutral
agents. The expected per-period payo for any subject who does nothing must be mdP
(md(1 P)) when subject is endowed with m units of the asset. If a subject purchases
n private signals, since such signals are costly, this subject must be expecting to make at
least m  d  P + n  c (m  d  (1   P) + n  c) from trading the asset. Because the game
is a constant sum game, this must imply that the remaining subjects must be averaging
m  d  P   nc
(s 1) (m  d  (1   P)   nc
(s 1)) from trading the asset. As this is less than what
they would get doing nothing, it is clearly better for them to do nothing, and then for
our rst subject it is not worthwhile to purchase any signal. This would suggest that we
would see no trade in a model in which all the agents are risk neutral.
3.3 Heterogenous beliefs
However, if dierent agents have dierent beliefs or dierent attitudes to risk then some
trade may be possible. Consider, for example, a situation in which individual A owns a
unit of the asset and is more risk-averse than individual B. Suppose they have the same
8beliefs and that the probability is that the dividend will be d. Then A would be happy
to sell his or her unit at any price bigger than the P which satises the expression:
u(P) =   u(d) + (1   )  u(0)
where u() is A's utility function, expressed relative to his present wealth and  is the
subject's belief about the true value of the dividend, whereas B would be happy to buy
this unit of the asset at any price less than the (1   P) which satises the expression:
v(0) = v(d   [1   P]) + (1   )v( [1   P])
where v() is B's utility function, expressed relative to his present wealth.
In general, we should be able to nd a price which satises these two conditions if B
is less risk-averse than A. Thus, if agents have the same beliefs but dierent attitudes to
risk, some trade may be possible. The converse situation, in which agents have dierent
beliefs but the same attitude to risk is somewhat dierent.
Suppose A and B know that they have the same risk attitude, then if they can nd a
price at which one wants to buy and the other wants to sell, what can they infer? What
they must infer is that they have dierent beliefs about the probability that the asset is
valuable. Let A denote A's probability and B denote B's probability. Then if there
exists a price at which A is happy to buy a unit and B is happy to sell a unit it must
follow that A > B; that is, A must be more optimistic than B about the probability
that the asset will be valuable. At this point, A must infer from the fact that B wants to
sell that A > B, and B must infer the same from the fact that A wants to buy. If they
each assume that the other is rational they may conclude that one or the other or both
of them is wrong. But this provides a clue why we might observe trade: everyone thinks
that they have better information than the others about what the dividend is going to
be. Obviously, this is impossible, but we have already argued that anything other than a
do-nothing situation can not be an equilibrium in the usual sense used by economists.
We should stress this point: apart from the buying of signals, the game is a constant
sum game and there is a total of msd
2 given by the experimenter to the n subjects each
market period. Apart from the buying of signals, each subject makes on average md
2 each
period. Subjects can guarantee this on average by doing nothing. However, the buying
of signals is costly and simply makes the subject average payo per period less than md
2 .
So why would anyone buy signals? And why would anyone else trade with anyone who
has bought signals? There seems to be no reason for any activity in our experiment. So
where does that leave us? It leaves us with some very simple predictions: First, if we
9believe in equilibrium theory in games (which is concerned more with the process than
the outcome), then we would expect to see no activity at all. Second, if we believe in the
predictions of the Grossman and Stiglitz branch of the literature (which is concerned with
outcomes rather than processes), we would expect to see the price converging to the true
dividend. But this leaves unanswered the question as to how the market converges. If we
believe it converges because everyone thinks that they are better at predicting the true
future dividend, then we leave open also the possibility that it converges to the wrong
value. But note the paradoxical nature of all of this. If an agent can predict the future
value of the asset and can trade on that information (buying at a price less than d when
the asset is going to be valuable and selling at a positive price when the asset is going
to be worthless) the agent can make a prot. But this must be at some other agent's
expense. As all agents know this, why might we observe any trade?
4 Ecient Market Benchmark
Using the Bayesian inference, we can compute the probability that the true state of the
world corresponds to the case of the dividend equal to 10 ECU conditioned on the series
of signals purchased by all subjects up to an instant of time T, which we denote as
IT = fi1;i2;:::it;:::;iTg. Note that here we do not specify the identity of the subject
who purchases the signals but just their sequential order; we refer to IT as the market
information set. The variable it takes the value  1, if it suggests that the dividend is
worth 0 ECU, or 1, if it suggests that the dividend is worth 10 ECU. In the following, we
omit the currency unit where not necessary.
4.1 Bayesian Inference with private information
The starting formula of the Bayesian inference is:
Pr(D = 10jIT) =
Pr(ITjD = 10)  Pr(D = 10)
Pr(IT)
: (1)
D = 10 refers to the case of the dividend equal to 10. Pr(D = 10jIT) is the probability of
observing the dividend equal to 10 conditioned on the market information set available at
time T. Pr(D = 10) is the prior probability of the event D = 10 without information or,
equivalently, conditioned on I0. Pr(IT) is the marginal probability (see eq. 5). Mutatis
mutandis, it is possible to compute the probability that the future state of the world is
the dividend equal to 0 ECU, or we can equivalently use the following relation:
Pr(D = 0jIT) = 1   Pr(D = 10jIT) ; (2)
10since we have just two possible states of the world.
Let us now assign the values to the dierent terms of eq. (1) as a function of:
 p is the probability that a single private signal is correct;
 q = 1   p is the probability that a single private signal is incorrect;
 NT is the number of signals in the information set available up to time T;
 nT is the number of 1s and NT   nT is the number of -1s in the information set.
Since we compute the probability Pr(D = 10jIT), the signals -1s and 1s refer to the
true state of the world D = 10. In other words, the case it = 1 suggests that the
dividend is 10, on the contrary, the case it =  1 suggests an asset worths zero.
In the following, when not necessary, we will omit the time variable T from the variables
nT and NT. The rst term of eq. (1) is given by:
Pr(ITjD = 10) = pn  qN n ; (3)
which is the probability of observing a given sequence of signals IT. Given that the two
states of the world are, by construction, equiprobable, the prior probability is given by:




The marginal probability takes the form:








Putting together eqs. (1), (3), (4) and (5), we obtain:
Pr(D = 10jIT) =
pn  qN n











it = 2nT   NT ; (7)
as the aggregate net signal available at time T, the previous equation takes the form:

















According to eq. (8), we can identify several interesting cases:
11 If p = 1 and therefore q = 0, Pr(D = 10jIT) = 1, which is independent of NT, when
not zero. It is the case of fully informative signals.
 If q = p = 0:5 then Pr(D = 10jIT) = 0:5. Purchasing signals does not provide any
new information compared to the starting condition of equiprobability of the two
states of the world.
 If T = 0, i.e. an equal number of 1s and -1s, Pr(D = 10jIT) = 0:5. It is obviously
the case at the beginning of the trading when there are no signals in the market,
and also might arise by chance during the experiment.
4.2 Bayesian inference with private and public information
The previous Bayesian inference formulas are based on the condition of constant quality
of signals, i.e. p is invariant across the signals. We can easily generalize the previous
formulas to signals of heterogenous quality. In our experimental setting, in fact, we have
several treatments with the contemporaneous presence of private signals of quality p and
a single public signal of quality P  p.9 In order to account for the impact of the public
signal in the Bayesian inference, let us dene as P the probability that the public signal
is correct and Q = 1 P, the probability that the public signal is incorrect. The variable
S will take the value 1 if the public signal suggests a dividend equal to 10ECU or  1 if it
suggests a worthless dividend. Eq. (3) is then modied as follows:









Using eqs. (10) and (11), we can easily modied eq. (8) in order to take into account
the public signal:












In order to illustrate the previous formula, let us focus on a simple example. Consid-
ering the values of P = 0:8 and Q = 0:2 of our experimental setting, let us assume that
there are no private signals in the market up to time T and that the only information
is the public signal, which is available at the beginning of the trading period. There-
fore, T = 0 = 0 and Pr(D = 10jIT;S = 1) = 0:8 or Pr(D = 10jIT;S =  1) = 0:2
9The quality of a signal is dened according to the probability of being correct.
12depending on the value suggested by the public signal. Therefore, the subjects at the
beginning of the trading period are not ignorant about the future state of the world, i.e.
Pr(D = 10) = Pr(D = 0) = 0:5, but they are biased in favor of one of them, induced by
the presence of the public signal.
As a further illustrative example of eq. (12), in Figure 1(b) we plot the probability of
observing a dividend D = 10 as a function of the net information T present in the market
at time T, for dierent qualities of the private signals10. Additionally, we can observe the
inuence of a correct or incorrect public signal. A high and positive net signal is in favor
of a higher chance of observing a positive nal dividend, conversely, a negative net signal
indicates a higher chance of a worthless nal dividend. We can, then, note that in the
case of a quality of the signal p = 0:6, it is necessary a net signal T  +12 in order to
be almost certain (with a condence level of 1%) to have a dividend equal to 10ECU.
A net signal T   12 indicates with almost certainty a dividend 0ECU. The presence
of a correct (incorrect) public signal creates a bias towards one or the other case, or,
equivalently, it decreases (increases) the critical net signal in order to identify with almost
certainty the nal dividend. In the case of a higher quality of the signal, it is drastically
reduced the value of the net signals necessary to reasonably identify the nal dividend.
4.3 Ecient market price
A market is ecient if all available and relevant information is incorporated into the price
of the asset at each instant of time. In our simple experimental setting, it means that the
the information set includes all information purchased by the traders, IT. The equilibrium
price, under risk neutrality assumption, is given by:








In the presence of a public signal S, the previous formula is:












The net signal in the market can be thought as T =
PN
n=1 n;T, i.e. the sum of the net
signals over all subjects. The previous formula means that if a subject buys a signal, the
information is incorporated into the price correctly and instantaneously as if the market
information would be available to all subjects.
10Without loss of generality, we might draw the graph in the case D = 0.
13(a) Low quality of the private signal (p=0.6)
(b) High quality of the private signal (p=0.8)
Figure 1: Probability of observing a future dividend D = 10 as a function of the aggregate net
private signal. The three curves refer to the case of correct, absence or incorrect public signal,
respectively.
14Figure 2: The gure shows the graph of T4M9 as an illustrative example.
5 Results
Probably the easiest way to summarize the results of our experiments is to show graphs
of the trading activity in each of the 10 markets of each of the 4 treatments. These are
presented in Figures from 8 through 13 included in the Appendix. Each panel of these
gures refers to one particular market. An example is reported in Figure 2, where we
displayed the 9th market of Treatment 4 (i.e. T4M9). On each panel the vertical axis
shows the price at which the trade took place and the horizontal axis shows the time at
which the trade took place. The small solid line is the trading price, the bold solid line
(either 10 or 0) above each market period shows the actual true dividend (revealed to the
participants just at the end of the trading period). The bold and less erratic line indicates
the price computed using eq. (13) or, when the public signal is available, eq. (14), which
we denote as Bayesian price. The squares indicate the public signal (either around 10 or
0), which is available to the subjects before the trading session starts. Note that there
are some cases where the Bayesian price and the bold line of the dividend coincide.
A simple inspection of these gures shows that there is a lot of activity. The subjects
buy information, post bids and asks (which, however, are not visible in the Figures),
and trade. The \do nothing" equilibrium seems to be not a meaningful description of
the trading behavior of the subjects in any of the considered treatments. In order to
analyze the market dynamics, we will focus attention on two aspects of the experiment:
the information acquisition and aggregation of information into market prices.
155.1 Analysis of the Market for Information
A crucial aspect of our experimental design is that the quantity of information available
in the market is endogenous. We can therefore analyze whether or under which conditions
the traders could discover the true state of the world. At this point we will focus attention
on the private information quality, the availability of public information and the infor-
mation quantity, which are the relevant characteristics in the analysis of the information
acquisition process.
5.1.1 Private Information Quality
As a rst step we analyze the number of private signals as a function of its quality and
the presence of a public signal. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the private signals
purchased across treatments. We observe that the number of purchased signals is signif-
icantly higher in Treatment 2 (p = 0:8) as compared to Treatment 1 (p = 0:6).11 When
we introduce a public signal, this pattern is conrmed as shown in Figure 3 when com-
paring Treatments 3 (P = 0:8, p = 0:6) and 4 (P = 0:8, p = 0:8).12 We can conclude that:
Result 1: Subjects purchase more signals the higher their quality.
5.1.2 The Availability of Public Information
Another interesting nding is related to the impact of a public signal on the number of
purchased signals. Fixing the quality of the private signal, the introduction of a public
signal signicantly reduces the number of private signals purchased by traders. This phe-
nomenon is observed when comparing Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) to Treatment 3 (Treat-
ment 4) in Figure 3. Therefore, we can infer that the presence of a public information has
a sort of crowding-out eect on the acquisition of private signals, i.e. a substitution of part
of market information provided by several private signals with a single public signal. The
crowding-out eect might be considered quite a natural consequence of the introduction
of a public information. We can summarize our ndings as follows:
Result 2: The access to public information reduces the quantity of private informa-
tion in the market: the crowding-out eect.
11A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis at a 1% signicance level.
12A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis at a 1% signicance level.
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Figure 3: Number of private signals purchased per treatment.
However, it remains an open question whether the presence of a public signal com-
pensates for the missing information due to the decrease of the number of private signals
in the aggregation of the market information. In other words, is the introduction of a
public information neutral, benecial or detrimental for the overall information acqui-
sition process? In order to address this question let us quantify how close the traders
were to discover the true value of the dividend. We rely then on eqs. (13) or (14) which
depend on the information set IT being eciently used. The ecient market hypothesis
is based on the idea that the traders make an optimal use of the available information,
which might probably be a strong (behavioral) assumption. However, such an assumption
allows us not to consider any ad hoc behavioral rules in describing the trading activity
of the subjects. Moreover, the ecient market benchmark can be thought as the upper
bound of the eciency in the utilization of the market information. Taking into account









where Bt is the Bayesian price given in eq. (14), D is the dividend and t denotes the
seconds in a trading period.13
13The choice of averaging over the last trading minute is a compromise between having good statistics for
17Using eq. (15) we can evaluate whether the introduction of a public signal is benecial
for the overall information eciency, that is, whether the introduction of the public signal
compensates for the missing private signals due to the crowding-out eect.14 This means
that the introduction of a public signal does not alter the distribution of the information
eciency in the markets, and therefore the market potential to discover the true value of
the dividend. We can conclude that the presence of public signal entirely compensates
for the crowding-out eect, i.e. the additional information that it provides is sucient
to counterbalance the reduction of private information present in the market, under the
assumption of an ecient utilization of the information.
Result 3: The crowding-out eect due to the public information does not reduce the
information eciency in the markets: the impact of the public information turns out to
be neutral.
5.1.3 The Quantity of Private Information
Up to now we have compared the information available to the traders across the treat-
ments, namely, the eect of the private signal quality and the introduction of a public
signal. Now we would like to evaluate whether the information present in the markets
is sucient to discover the true value of the dividend. Since the private information is
costly, to buy more or less signals than the necessary level makes the information acquisi-
tion process inecient. Then it comes the question: Are the traders optimally, under or
over informed?
In order to evaluate whether the information IT is sucient to discover the true divi-
dend value, we have to set a condence level to the information eciency measure intro-
duced in eq. (15). In principle, setting a threshold value on eq. (15), we can compute the
minimum net private signal (T in eq. (7)) sucient to discover the true dividend value
for a given condence level. The net private signal is dened as the number of correct
private signals minus the number of incorrect private signals conditioned on the true divi-
EBD and analyzing the last part of the trading activity, where the number of purchased private signals is very
low (between zero and few signals depending on the market) and therefore the Bayesian price is almost constant
over time. The results are robust with respect to the considered time interval for the average if one chooses
around one minute or less.
14A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of EBD is the same in
T1 (T2) when compared to T3 (T4).
18dend15. In Table 2 we give the minimum values of the net private signal which guarantees
aggregation at 1% and 10% condence levels across the implemented treatments16. These
sort of critical values can be visualized from casual inspection of Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
Only private signals Correct public signal Incorrect public signal
p = 0:6 12(6) 8(3) 15(9)
p = 0:8 4(2) 3(1) 5(3)
Table 2: Minimum net private signal in order to identify the true dividend value in the dierent
cases of our experimental setting, at 1% (10%) condence level.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the net private signal across the four treatments.
Let us start with the treatments where just private information is available to the subjects
and evaluate the impact of an increase in the quality of the private signals. In the majority
of cases17 the net private signal of Treatment 1 is not sucient for discovering the true
state of the world. From the box plot, in fact, we observe that the median is under the
minimum net signal of 6 given a condence level of 10% (see Table 2). If the quality of
the private signal increases, the picture changes dramatically. In Treatment 2 the net
private signal is well above the critical threshold (see Table 2 ), and, in fact, all markets
can potentially discover the value of the dividend both at 1% as well as 10% condence
levels. From Table 2 and Figure 4 we conclude that when the quality of information is low,
subjects tend to be under-informed, that is, the overall net private signal is not enough to
discover the true state of the world. On the contrary, when private information is more
precise, subjects are over-informed, that is, the overall net private signal is always more
than enough to discover the true value of the dividend.
15In order to understand the computation, let us give some illustrative examples: the net private signal of
market 1 in session 1 of Treatment 1 is +2; the net private signal of market 2 in session 1 of Treatment 1 is +2;
the net private signal of market 3 in session 1 of Treatment 1 is  2.
16We are aware that the chosen condence levels are quite arbitrary. As a partial justication of our choice,
the 1% level is based on the granularity of the prices, i.e. the traders cannot post bids and asks under 1/10ECU.
The level of 10% is somehow a less conservative choice and is below the precision of the public signal. Anyhow,
we have run a sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our results with respect to the choice of the condence
levels, showing that the conclusion of our analysis does not change (material upon request).
17The net private signal is sucient at the 1% condence level in 3 out of 20 cases
(T1S1M5,T1S1M9 and T1S2M8), while it is sucient at the 10% threshold in 7 out of 20 cases
(T1S1M4,T1S1M5,T1S1M7,T1S1M9,T1S2M7,T1S2M8,T1S2M10). The individual markets can be easily iden-
tied in the Figures included in the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Net private signal per treatment.
Let us consider now the treatments where public information is available. In Treatment
3, in the majority of cases the net private signal is not sucient for discovering the true
state of the world.18 We can conclude that when the private information has a low quality,
whether it is available or not a public signal, the traders are under-informed.
In Treatment 4 the subjects are still over-informed19 since the net private signal is
almost always above the critical level.
Result 4: The traders are largely under-informed when the quality of the private sig-
nal is low and over-informed when the quality is high, independently of the availability of
a public information.
18The net private signal is never sucient at the 1% condence level, while it is sucient at the 10% condence
level in 2 out of 20 cases (T3S2M2,T3S2M4), basically because the net private signal is 3 or higher and the
public signal is correct. The individual markets can be easily identied in the Figures included at the end of
the paper.
19The net private signal in above the minimum required level at both 1% or 10% condence level in all cases
but one (T4M9).
205.2 Analysis of the Price Eciency
In the previous section we have shown that the introduction of a public signal of good
quality compensates the crowding-out eect on the private signals. Our previous analysis,
however, is based on the strong assumption of optimal utilization of the information by
the experimental subjects and, therefore, using the Bayesian market price as benchmark.
In this section, we analyze the convergence of the market price to the Bayesian benchmark
under dierent qualities of the costly private information and the introduction a public
information. In other words we would like to know what the traders have done as a









where Bt is the Bayesian price given in eq. (14), PRt is the market price and t denotes the
seconds in a trading period (See footnote 13). With this measure we can easily quantify
the deviation from what the traders could have achieved using eciently the available
information and what they really do in their trading activity. In order to discriminate
whether the market reached eciency we set a 10% threshold, i.e. EBP < 0:1.20
Let us consider the eect of an increase in the quality of the information on our price
eciency measure. Figure 5 shows the distribution of EBPR across the dierent treat-
ments. If we compare Treatment 1 to Treatment 2, there is a striking dierence in terms of
eciency in the aggregation of the available information into prices, being such dierence
statistically signicant. The same pattern is observed when comparing Treatment 3 and
Treatment 4. Therefore we can conclude that the treatments where the private signal has
a higher quality turn out to be more ecient in incorporating information into prices. If
we take into account Result 1, the eciency of prices in incorporating the information
increases with the information available to the traders in the market. Put it dierently,
increasing information eciency leads to an increase in price eciency.
Result 5: More information available to the traders in the market, either in quantity
or quality, increases price eciency.
What happens when a public signal is released in the markets? From Figure 5 when
comparing Treatment 1 (Treatment 2) to Treatment 3 (Treatment 4) we can see that the
20We could have chosen a more conservative level. However, given the noisy nature of the experimental data,
such a level seems to be appropriate, see for example Levitt and List [2007].
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Figure 5: Time average of absolute dierence between Bayesian and market price.
introduction of a public signal signicantly reduces price eciency21, independently of
the quality of the private information. Additionally, the public information signicantly
increases the dispersion of the eciency measure.
From Result 3 we know that the reduction in the number of private signals is compen-
sated by the public signal. This implies that the introduction of the public information
does not aect the informational eciency of the markets. Then, which is the origin
of the striking dierence across treatments in the market performance when aggregating
information into prices? Does the public information play a role in the aggregation of the
available information into prices? If yes, which is this role?
In order to visualize the dierence between information eciency and price eciency in
Figure 6, we display the relationship between EBD and EDPR for the dierent treatments.
The lines represent the 10% condence level. Let us start from Figure 6(b). We can
see that in Treatment 2 the high informational eciency of the markets translates into
a high price eciency, that is, prices do incorporate all the relevant information. In
fact, in Treatment 2 all but one markets22 are below the condence level of 10%. For a
better visualization of the price behavior see Figure 10. From Result 3 we know that the
21A Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis at a 1% signicance level.
22In the market T2M2 one subject bought almost all assets, since (s)he had three private signals indicating
a dividend 10 ECU. Her/his own Bayesian price was 9.94 ECU. The price then increased up to almost 8 ECU
with a true dividend equal to 0 ECU. However (s)he was wrong.
22informational eciency in Treatment 4 is the same as in Treatment 2. However, in Figure
6(b) we observe that the market performance to incorporate information into prices is
denitely worst.
Therefore, we claim that the introduction of a public information is responsible for
the worsening in the price eciency of the markets. Consider that, despite being a high
quality signal, i.e. P = 0:8, there is a 20% probability that the public signal is wrong.
If such information constitutes a focal point for the traders, this could lead to a higher
deviation of the market price when compared to the Bayesian benchmark, considering
that in all markets in Treatment 4, the Bayesian benchmark is close to the true value
of the dividend. Our conjecture is in line with an increase in the dispersion of the price
eciency when introducing the public signal in Treatment 2. In fact, Figure 6(b) shows
that most of deviations are around 0.2, which conrms our conjecture. In some markets
the price eciency lies between 0.4 and 0.8. These are cases where the public signal is
wrong when predicting the true dividend value, but the private information in the market
is sucient for the traders to recognize such mistake and just partially correct for it. Even
when the private signals are of a high quality, the traders need some time to discover and
(partially) correct the mistakes of the public signal. Extrapolating such a behavior, we
might infer that the traders can achieve a much higher price eciency, probably close
to that in Treatment 2. What we would like to stress here is that is seems quite a slow
learning process for the traders to decipher the contemporaneous presence of public and
private signals and incorporating such information into prices.
When the quality of the private signal is low, from Figure 6(a) we conrm that,
although the informational eciency does not suer from introducing a public signal (see
Result 3), price eciency is signicantly reduced. Figure 7(a) can give us a clearer picture
of this phenomenon. Instead of price eciency we introduce a measure of how close the









where PRt is the market price, D is the dividend and t denotes the seconds in a trading
period. From Figure 7(a) we can observe that the market eciency measure uctuates
either around 0.2 or 0.8 in Treatment 3, whereas in Treatment 1 uctuates around 0.5.
This nding conrms our intuition that traders tend to follow the public signal, which
might be wrong. With a low quality private signal it is is hard to see whether traders can
recognize and correct the mistakes of the public information.
We can summarize our main ndings as follows:
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(a) Private signal p = 0:6
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(b) Private signal p = 0:8
Figure 6: Price convergence to the Bayesian benchmark.
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(a) Private signal p = 0:6
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(b) Private signal p = 0:8
Figure 7: Price convergence to the dividend value.
25Result 6: The introduction of a public signal keeps constant the market eciency but
worsens the price eciency due to the interplay between private and public information
on the mechanism of incorporating information into prices.
6 Conclusion
Inspired by the debate around the role that rating agencies and, in general, nancial
market key-players have played into the recent nancial turmoil, we have used a laboratory
experiments to investigate the role of public and private information in a nancial market.
We were motivated by the intuition that the introduction of a public information, in a
setting where individuals are endowed with the possibility of purchase private information,
can discipline the market in promoting the aggregation of subjects' private information
into prices.
We have shown a quite natural and well-know result, i.e. the increase of private
information into the markets favors the eciency of prices in aggregating information.
When introducing a public signal, such trivial picture becomes much more intriguing. The
public signal, in fact, strongly perturbs both, the information acquisition process and the
mechanism of incorporating information into prices.
Our experimental analysis shows three major results: i) the presence of a public signal
creates a crowding-out eect on the private signals; ii) the public information counter-
balances the reduced quantity of private information, therefore, leaving invariant the
informational eciency of markets; iii) the presence of a public signal aects negatively
the eciency of prices in incorporating and transmitting information.
As a nal conclusion of our experimental test, we observe that if the private information
is not of good quality, the public information dominates the market in the sense of driving
the price. If this market regime might be benecial in the case of correct release of public
information, the case of an incorrect public signal might lead the market towards a price
disconnect to the true fundamentals. Using the words of Taleb [2007], the market is fragile
and not robust against the black swan, a very rare case that might resalable the recent
nancial crisis.
26Appendix A: Information Purchased per Treatment
Market Session 1 N n N   n D
1 15 9 7 10
2 16 7 9 0
3 19 11 8 0
4 27 10 17 0
5 22 17 5 10
6 16 7 9 10
7 14 4 10 0
8 24 14 10 10
9 25 6 19 0
10 19 7 12 0
Market Session 2 N n N   n D
1 12 8 4 10
2 14 5 9 10
3 13 7 6 0
4 14 5 9 0
5 17 4 13 10
6 22 13 9 10
7 24 16 8 10
8 24 18 6 10
9 27 13 14 0
10 30 12 18 0
Table 3: Information purchased in Treatment 1.
Market Session 1 N n N   n D
1 34 8 26 0
2 33 10 23 0
3 31 8 23 0
4 29 6 23 0
5 29 21 8 10
6 22 5 17 0
7 26 19 7 10
8 23 5 18 0
9 21 3 18 0
10 18 3 15 0
Table 4: Information purchased in Treatment 2.
27Market Session 1 N n N   n D Public signal
1 15 11 4 0 10
2 14 7 7 0 0
3 15 8 7 0 0
4 14 6 8 0 0
5 13 9 4 0 0
6 12 10 2 10 0
7 18 10 8 10 0
8 14 8 6 0 0
9 23 15 8 10 0
10 23 13 10 10 0
Market Session 2 N n N   n D Public signal
1 2 1 1 10 0
2 3 0 3 0 0
3 9 5 4 10 10
4 4 0 4 0 0
5 8 3 5 0 10
6 5 0 5 10 10
7 6 3 3 0 0
8 1 0 1 0 0
9 3 1 2 10 0
10 4 1 3 0 0
Table 5: Information purchased in Treatment 3.
Market N n N   n D Public signal
1 9 9 0 10 10
2 25 4 21 0 0
3 20 17 3 10 0
4 23 6 17 0 0
5 16 3 13 0 10
6 19 14 5 10 10
7 24 2 22 0 0
8 32 3 29 0 0
9 18 8 10 0 10
10 12 10 2 10 10
Table 6: Information purchased in Treatment 4.
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